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As countries increasingly strive to transform their 
economies from agriculture-based into a diversified 
one, land rental will become of greater importance. 
It will thus be critical to complement research on the 
efficiency of specific land rental arrangements—such 
as sharecropping—with an inquiry into the broader 
productivity impacts of the land rental market. Plot-
level data for a matched landlord-tenant sample in an 
environment where sharecropping dominates allows 
This paper is a product of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a 
larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The authors may be contacted at dali1@worldbank.org or kdeininger@worldbank.org.  
this paper to explore both issues. The authors find that 
pure output sharing leads to significantly lower levels of 
efficiency that can be attenuated by monitoring while 
the inefficiency disappears if inputs are shared as well. 
Rentals transfer land to more productive producers but 
realization of this productivity advantage is prevented by 
the inefficiency of contractual arrangements, suggesting 
changes that would prompt adoption of different 
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Productivity effects of land rental markets in Ethiopia:  




It is well recognized that there is considerable potential for the agricultural sector to help improve labor 
productivity in rural areas through technology, integration into supply chains, and better functioning of 
factor markets including those for land and labor to facilitate off-farm employment (World Bank 2007). 
In the context of economic growth, low-cost and flexible mechanisms to bring land to its most productive 
use can help in the transformation of rural economies by allowing those with little comparative advantage 
in agriculture to take up non-agricultural employment and thus lay the basis for a more diversified growth 
(de Janvry et al. 2001). Given their greater flexibility and limited upfront capital requirements, rental 
markets allow greater flexibility than sales and allow owners working off-farm to continue enjoying the 
benefits of land ownership (Otsuka and Hayami 1988) while at the same time drawing on non-agricultural 
income (Deininger and Jin 2006). There is, however, concern that, especially if other markets do not work 
well, contractual arrangements adopted in such markets may fail to fully realize their potential. However, 
few empirical studies have explored productivity impacts of different forms of land rental, making it 
difficult to assess the scope and possible nature of policies to help realize such potential more fully. Doing 
so for the case of Ethiopia‟s highlands, where rental markets are quite active, is the goal of this paper. 
We use a sample of some 1,700 households and their 800 rental partners to address two questions that are 
critically important for productivity and welfare. First, the extent to which „Marshallian inefficiency‟ 
affects productive efficiency of sharecropping and whether parties can alter associated impacts. Second, 
whether landlords‟ choice of partners with greater agricultural ability affects the productivity impact of 
land rental market and the extent to which policy can help to encourage productivity-enhancing outcomes.  
Use  of  within-household  fixed  effects  estimates  for  owner-cum-tenants  to  answer  the  first  question 
suggests that output on sharecropped plots is significantly lower, by between 16% and 25%, than on 
owned plots cultivated by the same household. If landlords share in provision of inputs, the inefficiency 
will  disappear.  Landlords‟  monitoring  capacity,  i.e.,  being  a  farmer  or  having  off-spring  live  in  the 
village, attenuates but fails to eliminate the inefficiency arising from sharecropping contracts.  
While earlier analyses provided estimates of the magnitude of the „Marshallian inefficiency‟ comparable 
in magnitude to those obtained here, lack of information on partners in rental markets made it impossible 
to ascertain whether this was due to the contractual form, or to tenants‟ inherent productivity. Analysis of 
pair fixed effects for properly chosen plot samples, i.e., plots owned and cultivated by either the landlord   3 
or the partnering tenant, shows that tenants‟ productivity is higher than that of landlords by between 17 
and 26 percentage points suggesting that land rental could significantly enhance productivity. Still, this is 
counteracted by contractual arrangements; in fact we cannot reject the hypothesis that, despite tenants‟ 
productivity  advantage,  productivity  on  leased plots  is no  different  from  those  self-cultivated  by  the 
landlord. As this result is unlikely to be driven by unobserved land quality, use of sharecropping rather 
than  fixed  rental  arrangements  implies  that  rental  markets  fail  to  realize  their  productive  potential. 
Predominantly female landlords will draw little, if any benefits from having their land sharecropped as 
compared to cultivating it themselves. Policies such as insurance that would allow adoption of fixed rent 
contracts could thus increase welfare by both tenants and landlords.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two introduces the topic and uses descriptive statistics from 
household- and plot-level data to illustrate the setting and highlight evidence on working of rental markets 
from data on transaction partners. Section three discusses literature on the efficiency of sharecropping and 
introduces our analytical framework that extends the standard approach to allow for arrangements that 
might allow partners to reduce inefficiency of certain contractual arrangements and to assess potential and 
actual  productivity  differential  between tenants and  landlords.  Section four  presents results  from  the 
econometric analysis. Section five concludes by discussing potential policy implications.  
2. Background and descriptive statistics  
Our data come from a rural environment with limited non-agricultural labor markets and high levels of 
land rental market activity. High risk, social norms regarding females‟ roles, and large differences in 
wealth and endowments of critical factors, in particular oxen, imply that land is  mainly transferred from 
poor and often female headed landlords to relatively more affluent tenants with draught power. Contrary 
to what is observed elsewhere, rentals thus lead to greater concentration of operational holdings. Virtually 
all  rentals  involve  sharecropping  rather  than  fixed  rental  contracts.  Descriptive  results  suggest  that 
intensity of input use is lower on sharecropped than on owned plots. 
2.1 Household characteristics 
Our data are from the fourth round of a longitudinal survey in the Amhara region of Ethiopia‟s highlands 
conducted by the Ethiopian Development Research Institute jointly with the World Bank and Gothenburg 
University. Details of earlier rounds are described elsewhere (Deininger et al. 2008). A unique feature of 
the data is that, for participants on either side of the land market, rental partners from the same village 
were included in the sample and were administered essentially the same questionnaire.
1 In light of high 
                                                 
1 In the case of multiple partners, all partners within the village were to be interviewed. In East Gojjam, an unexpectedly large number of rental 
transactions implied that the partner questionnaire was administered to a randomly selected partner while a shorter questionnaire (without plot 
level production) was administered to the remaining partners within the village.    4 
levels of rental activity, this yields a sample of 1,700 randomly selected households plus their 787 rental 
partners (either landlords or tenants) from 14 villages (kebeles) in 6 districts (woredas) in South Wollo 
and East Gojam zones. The survey includes plot level data on production for the 2007 main season 
(meher,  i.e.  September-February),  household  characteristics  including  resource  endowments,  and 
participation in land, labor and credit markets.  
Table 1 presents household level information for the whole sample and separately for those leasing out, 
leasing in, and remaining in autarky on the entire sample.
2 With 69% of the households participating on 
either side (33% leasing out and 36% in),
 3 rental markets are fairly active but localized, with more than 
85% of transactions involving households from the same village and virtually no cases of simultaneous 
renting in and renting out.
4 With 63% of landlords still cultivating some of their own land and only 2% of 
tenants being landless, mixed tenancy predominates.  
Differences in gender and resource endowments  appear to be  key drivers of land market participation . 
Almost half (47%) of those renting out are female headed, compared to 17% and 3% of female headed 
households in autarky and renting in, respectively. Landlords have significantly less access to livestock 
and draught animals (0.4 oxen and bulls compared to an average of 1.3), supporting the notion of ill -
functioning markets for oxen rental as a driver of rental market activity. With some 70% of female headed 
households renting out land, land markets seem to transfer land from resource poor, female-headed, and 
slightly older households to wealthier ones with better access to family labor. This is in contrast to what is 
observed in m any other settings where skilled,  wealthy households rent  out land to pursue non -
agricultural options,
5 possibly because barriers to entry into non-farm activities in Ethiopia remain high. 
Rental markets contribute to a concentration of operational land holdings  relative to land ownership; the 
Gini coefficient  increases from  0.37 for owned  to  0.48 for operated  holdings, different from  other 
countries, e.g., China where rental markets help equalize the operational land distribution.
6  
To illustrate the extent to which land rental markets helped equalize factor ratios across households, table 
2 presents labor-to-land and oxen-to-land ratios  for different types of land  rental market participants 
before and after they entered the market.
7 While land markets almost fully equalize the oxen to land ratio 
to about 1.2 and reduced the labor to land ratio from 4.3 to 2.3 for tenants, they led to a large increase in 
                                                 
2 Equivalent information for the sub-sample with availability of matched partner information can be found in appendix table 1. 
3 The participants in the rental markets include transaction partners of the original sample. If the partners are excluded from the analysis, the share 
of market participants drops to 57% which still indicates the existence of active rental markets in the study areas. 
4 Less then 1% of households are reported to simultaneously lease out and lease in land.  
5 A similarly counter-intuitive pattern of „reverse‟ tenancy is observed in Madagascar where insecurity of tenure that poses asset risk on leased 
out plots is hypothesized to be one of the key underlying factors (Bellemare 2009).  
6 In China, a Gini of 0.36 for land use rights (comparable to ownership) was further reduced through transfers (Deininger and Jin 2005).  
7 Note that we have to exclude 53 landless tenants in the „before‟ and 289 pure landlords in the „after‟ panel of the table.    5 
labor to land ratios, from 2.96 to 11.16 (or a median of 1.91 and 5.26) for landlords.
8 This is in line with 
the importance of  oxen as a key factor of crop production (Holden et al. 2011, Pender and Fachamps 
2006).   
2.2 Plot characteristics 
Table 3 summarizes details on inputs and outputs at plot level, overall and by land market participation, 
for the  entire  owner-cum-tenant sub-sample  (i.e.,  owners  who  also  rent  in;  see  appendix table  2 for 
corresponding information on the restricted sample where partner information is available). More than 
95% of the 2,083 (1,135 for the restricted sample) leased plots are sharecropped (12% under input sharing 
and  88%  using  a  simple  output  sharing)  and  less  than  5%  use  fixed  rent.
9  To avoid  biases from 
underreporting of output for continuously harvested  crops or non-availability of price information,  we 
exclude the few plots with vegetables, fruits  or trees.
10 This can be justified as the survey villages are 
located predominantly in cereal producing areas. 
The top panel of table 3 suggests that most plot transfers involved close kin: 66% between relatives or in-
laws, 11% among friends or neighbors, and only 23% among unrelated individuals (possibly members of 
informal associations). Almost half of transferred plots are owned by female headed households.  While 
most rental contracts (70%) are open-ended, the mean rented plot in the sample had been in the  current 
tenant‟s possession for more than 4 years. As this is about three times the mean contract duration of those 
who reported a fixed term, contract renewal seems frequent.  
While descriptive data point to few differences in terms of observable soil fertility characteristics between 
tenure regimes, they prima facie suggest Marshallian inefficiency.
11 With a difference of 18 percentage 
points (significant at 5% if one outlier is excluded),  owner-cum-sharecroppers  produce less on  their 
sharecropped than their owned (or fixed rented) plots. This is mirrored by large differences in application 
of inputs between plots held under different rental arrangements. Use of family labor is, with 191 vs. 129 
days/ha, more than 30% higher on owner -operated as compared to sharecropped plots.  Although hired 
labor is, with some 8 days/ha, used less intensely than family labor, its use is higher on owned than on 
leased plots as well. Differences extend to manure application; while 26% of owned plots receive manure, 
only 6% of leased plots do so and even for this group, the quantity applied is four times higher on owned 
plots (393 vs. 93 kg/ha).  Chemical fertilizers are applied more equally on owned and leased plots with 
                                                 
8 It is important to note that possible participation in off-farm or self employment activities are not considered in the analysis. Landlords may be 
more likely to get involved in such activities compared to tenants. Therefore, interpretation of the results requires some caution. 
9 Summary statistics are not affected by the small number input sharing and fixed rental contract s. Therefore, most of the discussion focuses on 
leased-in plots irrespective of the type of the contract. 
10 A total of 371 plots (29 rented-in and 342 owned plots operated by owner-cum-tenants planted to vegetables, fruits or tree crops) are dropped 
from the analysis due to the difficulty of computing output values.  
11 Note that the figures reported below are for owner-cum-tenants within the same household in all cases thus excluding non-contractible factors 
or (labor) market imperfections that could reduce productive efficiency across households.   6 
about 40% of each types of plots receiving an average of 50 kg/ha. In line with factor equalization as 
presented in table 2, use of oxen for land preparation is less unequal although, with a difference of 4 
oxen-pair days/ha, it is still higher on owned than leased plots.  
Although one might expect that, to reduce the scope for shirking, landlords might require tenants to grow 
less labor intensive crops on leased plots descriptive statistics suggest otherwise; teff, the traditional labor 
intensive staple is grown on 36% of leased vs. 29% of own plots. Multivariate analysis will be required to 
assess which of these effects can be attributed to share tenancy. Before conducting such analysis, we 
report descriptive statistics for matched tenant-landlord pairs that can give an indication of whether rental 
markets transfer land from less to more able and productive farmers, thus providing some initial evidence 
on potential productivity impacts of land rental contracts.
12 
Comparing input and output quantities, plot characteristics,  and crop choice by operator-cum-landlords 
and their rental partners who also cultivate their own land (i.e.,  owner-cum-tenants) in table 4 points to 
some interesting observations. The value of crop  output per hectare  differs markedly between the two 
categories with average productivity on plots operated by owner-cum-tenants 20% higher than on those 
cultivated by landlord farmers. The top panel suggests that  this difference could be partly explained by 
observed input applications: with the exception of manure and use (but not the amount) of hired labor, the 
intensity  with which  family labor, oxen power, and chemical fertilizer are  used is  higher on plots 
cultivated  by  operator -cum-tenants  compared  to  their  rental  partners.  This  could  imply  higher 
productivity by  tenants compared to their  partners who cultivate some of their land  but econometric 
analysis is needed to confirm this and explore sources that could underlie such differences.  
3. Conceptual framework and empirical strategy 
Use of partner data allows us to take a three-pronged approach to assess productivity implications of land 
rental, each with different samples. To assess existence and magnitude of Marshallian inefficiency, we 
compare productivity on owner-cum-tenants‟ owned and sharecropped plots. If such inefficiency were 
outweighed by differences in farming ability, rental transactions could still contribute to higher levels of 
productive efficiency. The tenant and landlord sample is thus used to compare productivity on owner-
operated plots by tenants and their landlords to estimate differences in ability differences or equivalently 
the maximum potential productivity gain from land rental. Comparing productivity between landlords‟ 
owned and cultivated and leased out plots provides an estimate of the actual productivity impact of land 
rental, i.e., the extent to which potential productivity gains are realized in practice.  
                                                 
12 In line with what emerged at the household level, comparing plots in our two samples (table 3 for the entire sample and appendix table 2 for 
plots with matching partner information), points towards very few significant differences, suggesting that the latter are representative of the 
overall population.   7 
3.1 Testing the efficiency of sharecropping  
In a world of perfect information, complete markets and zero transaction costs, the distribution of land 
ownership will affect welfare but will not matter for efficiency as market transactions allow everybody to 
operate at an optimum farm size (Feder 1985). In addition to non-agricultural options which will affect 
potential tenants‟ reservation utility, labor (which needs to be supervised), credit and insurance market 
imperfections as well as transaction costs due to search and contract enforcement will, however, affect the 
outcomes from land rental markets. The efficiency outcome might not always prevail and heavily depends 
on the choice of contractual arrangements. 
By varying the share and the fixed payment to the tenant, land owners who wish to rent out can achieve 
any combination of contractual forms from a wage labor contract through a share contract to a fixed rental 
contract. While all contracts will lead to equivalent outcomes if output is certain and tenants‟ effort can be 
monitored and enforced (Cheung 1969), relaxation of this assumption gives way to a number of scenarios. 
If  effort  cannot  be  monitored and  agents are  risk  neutral,  fixed  rental  contracts are  optimal. This is 
because in a pure sharecropping contract tenants will equalize the marginal disutility of effort to their 
marginal benefit, and so exerting less than the socially optimal amount of effort and obtain lower levels of 
production.  For  risk-averse  agents,  the  optimum  outcome  will  require  a  trade-off  between  the  risk-
reducing properties of the fixed-wage contract, under which the tenant's residual risk is zero, and the 
incentive effects of the fixed rental contract, which would result in optimal effort supply but no insurance 
against bad events. Second, limited tenant wealth has a similar effect because in case of a negative shock 
tenants with insufficient wealth are likely to default on rent payments. This implies that landlords will 
tend to enter into fixed rental contracts only with tenants who are wealthy enough to pay the rent under all 
possible output realizations, implying that poorer tenants will be offered only a share contract (Shetty 
1988). Finally, a dynamic setting opens up a number of additional perspectives besides the scope for 
using  the  repeated  game  context  and  the  threat  of  eviction  to  reduce  the  efficiency  losses  of 
sharecropping. On the other hand, a rental contract that provides tenants with adequate incentives to 
maximize profits in any given time period may lead to overexploitation of the land if (dis)investment is 
considered, implying that a share contract with lower-powered incentives and possibly compensation may 
be more appropriate (Ray 2005).  
A large literature has focused on testing the extent of inefficiency involved in sharecropping contracts, with 
often mixed results (Otsuka and Hayami 1988). Within-household data suggest that, in India, share tenancy 
is associated with an average productivity loss of 16% (Shaban 1987). Part of the losses might have been 
policy-induced as fixed rental contracts were outlawed in the study area. Recent studies using household 
fixed effects suggest that, in light the constraints faced agents‟ choice of contractual arrangements is rational   8 
(Arcand et al. 2007, Jacoby and Mansuri 2009) so that the scope for policy to bring more efficient outcomes 
is limited (Otsuka et al. 1992, Otsuka and Hayami 1988, Pender and Fafchamps 2006, Shaban 1987). We 
use the same methodology but add elements to explore how other factors affect the size of inefficiencies. 
For example, if landlord and tenant are close kin, monitoring costs associated with sharecropping can be 
reduced (Sadoulet et al. 1997). In Ethiopia, lower efficiency of tenants renting in from female landlords is 
attributed to females‟ inferior ability to monitor or enforce sanctions (Holden and Bezabih 2009).
13  
To test whether sharecropping contracts are (in)efficient, we follow the literature in restricting the sample 
to owner-cum-tenants and use within-household variation  under the assumption of constant returns to 
scale to identify the impact of contractual arrangements, controlling for household-specific characteristics 
that do not differ between owned and sharecropped plots  (Bell 1977, Shaban 1987). Formally, the base 
equation to be estimated is: 




hi u Z F S y             (1) 
where yhi is the log of crop output per hectare on plot i by household h; Shi is a dummy that is one if the 
plot is sharecropped and zero otherwise; Fhi is fixed rental dummy; and Zhi is a vector including a set of 
dummy variables relating to a plot‟s soil quality, topography, and access to irrigation, as well as the 
number of years it has been possessed by the current user. The first element of the error term, uh, captures 
observed and unobserved household-level heterogeneity arising from managerial ability, credit access, or 
risk aversion that affect production on all household plots equally while νhi is a plot specific error term 
assumed to be identically and independently distributed with mean zero and finite variance. Including 
household fixed effects (uh) also eliminates scope for sample selection bias that may result from the use of 
a sub-sample of households who simultaneously cultivate their own and rented in land. This is because of 
the fact that sample selection bias in panel data estimation arises only if unobservables that determine 
selection vary across different observations for the same unit of analysis (Verbeek and Nijman 1992). 
Also, the assumption of constant returns to scale is critical and we report results from testing for it at 
holding  level  in  appendix  table  3.  The  null  hypothesis  of  constant  returns  to  scale, i.e.,  the  sum  of 
coefficients for land, labor, draft power, chemical fertilizer and manure equaling one, cannot be rejected 
at conventional levels.
14 The coefficients on sharecropping and fixed rental dummies, γ
s and γ
f, can then 
be interpreted as the estimated percentage differences in yield for leased compared to owned plots by the 
same household. 
                                                 
13 Note that Kassie and Holden (2007) find higher productivity on sharecropped than owned plots which they attribute to eviction threats, the 
effectiveness of which is reduced for close kin. 
14 OLS estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production function parameters might be affected by endogeneity of some variable inputs. The potential 
for this is small, though, because in Ethiopian subsistence agriculture the levels of most major inputs such as land, draft p ower and family labor 
are determined in the early stages of the crop production cycle conditional on “anticipated” output before realization of stochastic shocks that are 
predominately weather related. It has been shown that if producers make input decision based on “expected” rather than actual output, single 
equation estimation of Cobb-Douglas production function is likely to provide unbiased and consistent parameters (Zellner et al. 1966).    9 
We conduct several robustness tests on this specification. First, yield differences could be due to crop 
choice and associated differences in input intensity. We include dummies on the right-hand side variables, 
implicitly treating crop choice as exogenous, to accommodate this possibility, thus providing us with a 
measure of sharecropping-induced inefficiency attributable purely to intensity of variable input use.
15 
Second, we split the sharecropping dummy into two—one for sharing of output only and one for output 
plus input sharing—to test whether input sharing arrangements will affect efficiency. We also expand the 
specification to control for tenant-landlord relationships and kinship that may reduce the inefficiency of 
sharecropping contracts (Kassie and Holden 2007). Levels of observed inputs are then controlled for to 
check whether, beyond affecting intensity of inputs use, sharecropping has other effects on productivity. 
Finally, to address concerns about possible underreporting of output on sharecropped plots, we repeat 
similar analysis for the intensity of family labor, draft power and chemical fertilizer use.
16  
The fact that optimum contract choice depends on substitutability between observable and unobservable 
inputs when tenant‟s actions are not observed may make contract choice on leased plots endogenous and 
thus bias estimates (Arcand et al. 2007). In practice, lack of identifying instruments has made it difficult 
to address this concern. While household fixed effects remove bias that may be due to partner choice on 
the basis of unobserved factors, access to information on rental partners allows us to instrument using 
landlord characteristics, in particular distance of the plot from the landlord‟s homestead, age, sex, and 
literacy status of the landlord‟s head, demographic composition, primary activity, and resource or asset 
endowments (land, oxen, other livestock, iron roof).  
3.2 Ability differences between landlords and tenants  
Ideally, study of productivity impacts of land rental transactions would require information on contracting 
parties and production on the same plot before and after it had been transferred. No study using the full 
set of such information is known to us. One alternative that has been used in the literature is to draw on 
the fact that household fixed effects allow recovery of parties‟ ability (Lanjouw 1999) to assess potential 
productivity impacts of rental market operation (DeSilva 2000, Deininger 2003, Deininger and Jin 2005). 
Recall  data  on  productivity  by  rental  partners  have  been  used  as  an  alternative  method  to  assess 
productivity impacts of rentals (Deininger and Jin 2007).  
To address this specific issue, we exploit the fact that detailed information was collected on matching 
rental partners, we use pair- rather than household-fixed effects to recover the difference in productivity 
between landlord and tenant in the pairs that are actually realized. To avoid confounding productivity-
                                                 
15 In fact, household fixed effects at least partially purge any potential bias that may arise from crop choice decisions in response to unobserved 
household specific factors and plot level characteristics that are likely to affect crop choice decisions are already included. 
16 While household fixed effects models are feasible for family labor and  draft power, a random effects model is estimated to account for the 
presence of nontrivial proportion of zero observations in the case of chemical fertilizer.   10 
effects with those related to incentives due to contractual arrangements, the comparison is limited to only 
plots owned by either the landlord or the tenant.
17 Considering once again a linearly homogeneous Cobb-
Douglas production function as in equation (1), the econometric model to be estimated is:  
  phi p phi ph phi u Z T y           (2) 
where yphi denotes the log value of crop output per hectare on plot i by household h of rental partner pair 
p; Tph is a dummy that equals one for tenants, and Zphi is a vector of exogenous plot characteristics such as 
soil quality and topography (measured by several dummy variables), irrigation access, and the number of 
years the plot has been cultivated by the current operator. Again, up captures observed and unobserved 
rental pair-specific variables; νphi is a plot specific error term assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed with mean zero and finite variance; γ and α are parameters to be estimated. To the extent that 
unobserved land attributes are controlled for, γ, the coefficient of the tenant dummy, will provide an 
unbiased estimate of the mean productivity differential between the rental partners in each pair that can be 
interpreted as the potential gain from land rental market operation. Potential reasons for such differences 
(e.g., farming ability or access to credit or insurance) can then be further explored. As the pair-fixed effect 
captures only factors common to the partners, the operator‟s holding size is included as an additional right 
hand side variable to control for any potential scale effect. 
Unlike in equation (1), unobservable characteristics that may determine partner choice will not be fully 
absorbed by the partner fixed effect so that selectivity bias may be an issue that has to be corrected for. As 
there  are  four  mutually  exclusive  groups  of  households,  i.e.,  owner  cultivators,  owner-cum-tenants, 
landlord cultivators and pure landlords, we address this using a multinomial logit selection model based 
on Lee (1983).
18 This involves estimation of a first stage multinomial logit model for selection into the 
different rental market participation regimes. Right hand side variables include farm and household assets 
(owned area, proportion of good soil quality land, number of bulls and oxen that are used as draft power, 
value of other livestock, and corrugated iron roof); household  composition (number of dependents, male 
adults and female adults); and  head characteristics (age, sex, literacy level, and whether farming is the 
primary  activity).  All  of  these  had  earlier  been  identified  as  key  determinants  of  rental  market 
participation in the study areas (Deininger et al. 2008). In the second stage, equation (2) is estimated by 
                                                 
17 A referee pointed out that, due to the disincentive effects of sharecropping contracts, owner-cum-tenants are likely to reallocate effort and 
physical inputs to their owned plots more than it would have been the case if all their cultivated land were self owned. This likely leads to higher 
yield in owned plots which will, in turn, be transmitted into overestimation of the yield differential between owned plots cultivated by tenants and 
that of their rental partners. To check the robustness of our results, we also estimate equation (2) by including all owned and rented in plots 
cultivated by the tenant. The results (not reported, but available upon request from the authors) are not different from those reported in table 8.  
18 Alternatively, the modified Dubin and McFadden (1984) procedure, as proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2007), is also used, but the results are 
the same and hence are not reported for the sake of brevity.    11 
including selection correction terms (i.e., conditional probability of being owner-cum-tenant or landlord 
cultivator) from the first stage regression.
19  
To assess the extent to which potential productivity gains are realized, we estimate  equation (2) on all 
plots owned by the landlords in the sample  with Tph a dummy equaling 1 if the plot is cultivated by a 
tenant and 0 otherwise. If unobserved plot characteristics do not vary systematically between plots kept 
by landlords and those rented out to tenants, the coefficient γ in this regression provides an estimate of the 
productivity gain actually realized by transacting land in the market. As landlord fixed effects fully absorb 
the choice of being a landlord cultivator there is no need to correct for selection bias in this case. 
4. Estimation results 
Results point towards Marshallian inefficiency that is reduced or vanishes if landlords‟ ability to monitor 
and their participation in managerial decisions through input sharing is accounted for. Tenants‟ farming 
ability is estimated to exceed landlords‟ by about 20%, suggesting that rental markets indeed transfer land 
to inherently more productive farmers. Productivity on plots cultivated by tenants is, however, statistically 
indistinguishable from  that on self-cultivated plots by their landlords. To the extent that Marshallian 
inefficiency of sharecropping underlies this phenomenon, changes such as making insurance available to 
allow adoption of different contractual arrangements could thus help realize a larger share of the potential 
productivity gains from land rental and, in the setting concerned, also have positive equity impacts.  
4.1 Efficiency of sharecropping arrangements and contract choice  
Results from different specifications of the household fixed effects regression of equation (1) for the 
entire sample of owner-cum-tenant households are reported in table 5 with own plots as omitted category 
throughout.
20 Initially we control only for observable plot characteristics  (col. 1), successively adding 
dummies for crop choice, input sharing, and kinship. The basic specification suggests that productivity on 
sharecropped plots is 8% lower than on owned plots by the same household, similar to what was obtained 
in other studies  (Deininger et al. 2008). No inefficiency is found for fixed rental contracts. Once crop 
choice is controlled for (col. 2), the coefficient on the sharecropping dummy is more precisely estimated 
and of larger magnitude (13%), supporting the notion that Marshallian inefficiency exists irrespective of 
the type of crop grown and, in fact, increases if crop choice is controlled for.  
Splitting the sharecropping dummy into two, one for pure output sharing and one for joint output and 
input sharing allows us to explore the impact of contractual arrangements (col. 3). We note that, if outputs 
                                                 
19 Conditional probabilities are included separately for owner-cum-tenants and landlord cultivators interacted with T and (1-T), respectively. This 
is similar to a two-step estimation of the switching regression model. 
20 We use data on owner-cum-tenants from both the randomly selected original sample of households and their rental partners. To check whether 
pooling the two data has affected our results, we run similar regressions on plots operated by owner -cum-tenants from the original sample only. 
The results, not reported here, are similar to those presented in table 5.    12 
and inputs are shared, productivity is no longer significantly different from that on owned plots by the 
same household, suggesting that this arrangement provides tenants with an incentive to use optimal levels 
of inputs, thus making the inefficiency disappear.
21 By contrast, the coefficient on output sharing is  of 
comparable magnitude to what was observed earlier, suggesting limited if any impact of this modality on 
productivity. Adding information on the landlord such as gender (col. 4) or relationship to the tenant (col. 
5) does not support the notion that  Marshallian inefficiency is particularly large for female landlords as 
was found to be the case in Tigray  (Holden and Ghebru 2011). Similarly, landlords who are relatives of 
the tenant are not automatically better positioned to prevent shirking. At the same time, the difference in 
output per ha  due to  sharecropping disappears  once  input use is  controlled  for  (appendix table  4), 
suggesting that higher  productivity  on  sharecroppers‟  owned  plots  can  largely  be  attributed  to  more 
intensive use of observed labor and non-labor inputs. 
To complement these results and address potential concerns about cultivator households underreporting 
output from sharecropped plots, appendix table 5 presents the estimate of the difference in the intensity of 
input application between owned and sharecropped plots while accounting for operator household specific 
effects.  We  find statistically  significant  differences in  the intensity  of  family  labor,  draft  power  and 
chemical fertilizer use between owned and sharecropped plots. For male adult family labor and total labor 
(including female family labor and hired labor) intensity is estimated to be some 15 percentage points 
lower on sharecropped plots as compared to owned plots (cols. 1 and 2), a figure that increases to about 
20 percentage points for oxen (col. 3). Results from a random effects regression for fertilizer application 
in col. 4 indicate that, conditional on use of any fertilizer, sharecropped plots receive about 28% less 
fertilizer than owned plots. Overall, and consistent with findings for yields, results point toward shirking 
in tenants‟ supply of labor or effort that is not compensated by more intensive use of purchased inputs.    
Table 6 reports results from using only the matched sample which, after dropping 1678 plots,
22 allows us 
to include  landlord characteristics such as  whether the  landlord is a farmer  and the number of  adult 
children who live in the same village and can thus help in monitoring the actions of the tenant. Doing so 
provides a few new insights:
23 First, the point estimate of the coefficient on sharecropping is, with -0.18, 
more than double the original estimate (table 5, col. 1). Second, having the landlord involved in farming 
is estimated to  significantly reduce, but not eliminate  Marshallian inefficiency as illustrated by results 
from the F-tests in the bottom of table 6 which consistently reject the hypothesis of no inefficiency (γ+β= 
                                                 
21 It is worth mentioning that one should be cautious in interpreting the results because the numbers of plots with fixed rental and a combination 
of output and input sharing arrangements are very small, and hence the parameters may not be precisely estimated. 
22 As output and input intensities on fixed rent plots cannot be distinguished from owner operated ones, we drop the separate fixed rent dummy . 
In practice this implies that the few observations (39 plots in the matched sample) under fixed rent arrangements are treated  as equivalent to 
owner operated plots. Inclusion of a separate fixed rental dummy yields qualitatively similar results that are available from the authors on request  
23 To test that the results are not affected by the difference in sample, we also rerun the  earlier regressions for the restricted sample. We find that 
in all cases the coefficients on the sharecrop dummy are indeed not significantly different from those reported in table 5.    13 
0).  The  number  of  adult  children  in  the  same  village  is  estimated  to  reduce  the  inefficiency  of 
sharecropping (col. 2 and 4), though the coefficient is much smaller. As almost two thirds (63%) of 
landlords engage in farming and 46% have it as their main activity (table 1), monitoring thus seems to be 
important to reduce negative impacts of sharecropping on productivity. Third, consistent with what was 
found earlier the inefficiency vanishes on plots cultivated under contracts that involve sharing of output as 
well as input (col. 3 and 4).  
To control for endogeneity of contract choice, landlord characteristics are used as identifying instruments 
as discussed above. First stage regressions for linear probability models of output and input sharing as 
presented in appendix table 6 suggest that wealthy landlords who are farmers themselves are more likely 
to  engage  in  input  sharing  and  that  this  arrangement  is  less  likely  on  plots  more  distant  from  the 
landlord‟s homestead. The corresponding IV estimates for the impact of sharecropping on productivity 
are presented in table 7. All identifying instruments are jointly highly significant, supporting our choice of 
instruments. Across a wide range of methodologies, i.e., irrespectively of whether 2SLS, GMM, limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML)  or the Fuller method (Fuller 1977),  overidentification tests 
(Sargan-Hansen J or Anderson-Rubin statistics) fail to reject the statistical validity of the instruments. The 
Anderson  correlations  likelihood  ratio  tests  also  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  models  are 
underidentified. While 2SLS and GMM point to somewhat weak instruments, the other estimators (LIML 
and Fuller) reveal no sign of weak instruments being a problem.  
Substantively, these results point towards a significant negative effect of output sharing (that disappears if 
inputs are also shared) even after adjusting for endogeneity of contract choice. Coefficients on output and 
input sharing dummies and the variables proxying for landlords‟ monitoring capacity are more precisely 
estimated and of higher magnitude than earlier. Most importantly, our point estimate of the Marshallian 
inefficiency increases to 0.25 with farmer-landlords having the potential to reduce it by half.  
4.2 Productivity differential among rental partners and gains from trade  
Table 8 reports results from partner fixed effects estimates of equation (2) where our main interest is on 
the coefficient of the tenant dummy which takes the value of 1 if a plot is owned and cultivated by the 
tenant and 0 if it is owned and cultivated by the landlord. All estimates point towards a statistically 
significant  and  quantitatively  large  productivity  differential  between  landlords  and  tenants.  Tenants‟ 
productivity is estimated to be 17% and 26% higher than that of landlords‟ depending on whether or not 
holding size of the cultivator household is controlled for (cols. 1-3).
24 Coefficients on other variables, in 
particular observed land quality characteristics, have the expected signs with levels of output estimated to 
                                                 
24 Omitting holding size appears to underestimate the yield differential between tenants and their partner by some 10 percentage points.   14 
be higher by 26%, 16%, and 35% on plots with good and medium land quality as well as irrigation, 
respectively and crop choice estimated to have a significant impact on the intensity of output as well.  
Results so far are based on a sample of tenants and landlord cultivators, raising potential concern about 
possible self-selection into the different rental market participation regimes. To correct for potential bias 
along these lines, we us Lee‟s (1983) multinomial logit approach as described earlier.
25 Results with 
selectivity correction are reported in columns 4 to 6 of table 6.  A first point to note is that the selection 
correction variables are jointly significantly different from zero, implying  a need to adjust for selection 
into rental market participation regimes to more precisely estimate the productivity differential between 
tenants and landlord cultivators. Although findings are  generally consistent with the results discussed 
above, the magnitude of the point estimate of the tenant dummy almost doubles once selection bias is 
controlled for. A related issue is the way in which the use of a sub-sample of tenants with (only) matching 
landlord cultivators affects the estimated parameters. While there is limited scope to address this concern 
in a cross section, the fact that our panel includes information on landlords or tenants who cultivated land 
earlier allows us to recover fixed effects for pure landlords and tenants  (with no matching partner data) 
that can be compared to that of those included in our sample. For all possible comparisons, we can never 
reject the null hypothesis that differences are n ot significantly different from zero, suggesting that  it is 
highly unlikely for selection bias to drive our results.
26  
To probe for potential systematic disadvantages faced by female landlords—possibly due to lower social 
status or discrimination—in Tigray (Holden and Ghebru 2011), we include a female dummy. The results 
in cols. 2 and 5 show that the coefficient on this variable is statistically insignificant, and that neither the 
significance nor the magnitude of the coefficient on the tenant dummy is affected. We thus reject the 
hypothesis that rental markets in our study area are biased against women; possibly that differences in 
policy,  e.g.,  restrictions  on  land  rental  in  Tigray,  might  explain  the  difference  to  what  was  found 
elsewhere. A general conclusion is that policies that facilitate land rental, by increasing security of tenure 
or reducing conflict, for example, could significantly benefit women landlords.  
A broader puzzle is why, as suggested by the regression with landlord fixed effects (table 9), tenants‟ 
higher levels of farming ability ascertained earlier do not translate into productivity gains through land 
rental markets. Unobserved differences in land quality, whereby landlords will keep the best plots for 
themselves and rent out the lower quality ones (Jacoby and Mansuri 2008), might partially explain this 
                                                 
25 For the sake of brevity the first stage multinomial selection regression is not reported, but the results are available upon request from the 
authors. Overall, the results show that land is transferred from resource poor (in terms of family labor, ownership of oxen and other livestock, and 
farming experience) female headed households to relatively resource rich male headed households. 
26 Our estimated measure of ability does not significantly vary across types of landlords, i.e., pure landlords (82 households cultivating 452 plots), 
landlords with no matching partner data (90 households cultivating 749 plots) and operator landlords with matching partner data (151 households 
cultivating 1237 plots). Similar results emerge for the different types of tenants, i.e., tenants with pure landlord partners  (128 households), with 
no partner data (180 households) and with partner data (158 households) cultivating 1744, 2088 and 2171 plots, respectively.   15 
observed outcome. However, although we cannot test for this explicitly, landlords would have a strong 
incentive to behave in this way under fixed rental rather than under sharecropping contracts. A second 
possible  reason  may  be  that,  in  a  high-risk  environment  with  insurance  market  imperfections, 
sharecropping involves less risk than fixed rental contracts and may thus be preferred by the parties 
involved.  This  is  remarkable  because,  contrary  to  the  standard  argument,  in  our  context  of  „reverse 
tenancy‟, this implies that small landlords provide insurance to land-rich tenants and transition to fixed 
rental arrangements could improve efficiency and equity. This is of relevance for policy in light of the 
fact that incentive-compatible and economically viable mechanisms to insure against risk, e.g., through 
indexed  rainfall  insurance,  have  been  implemented  successfully  in  other  contexts.  As  fixed  rental 
contracts  were  earlier  shown  to  be  being  fully  efficient,  the  size  of  the  Marshallian  inefficiency 
documented above, net of land quality differences, provides an estimate of the potential benefits from 
making this transition.  
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
As more and more developing countries, including Ethiopia, aspire to rapid economic transformation and 
structural change, the importance of rental markets to labor movement out of agriculture and to help 
transfer land to more productive users is likely to increase dramatically. Ensuring efficient operation of 
such markets is thus of great importance. Our results suggest that, in the case of Ethiopia, efficiency 
losses due to land rental are large with estimates of up to 24%. By using a comprehensive set of partner 
data, we can show that such inefficiency is not due to lower tenant productivity but to the choice of 
sharecropping as the dominant form of contractual arrangements. Within these arrangements, resident 
landlords can take measures to share inputs or supervise more closely, but the scope for such measures is 
limited and likely to further decrease in the future.  
Our findings are of relevance for research as well as policy. From a research perspective,  failure to 
separate the impact of ability from that of contractual choice, together with variation in these parameters 
over time and space, could explain the divergence and lack of consistency in empirical estimates of 
productivity-effects of sharecropping in the literature (Otsuka and Hayami 1988). From a methodological 
perspective,  a  slight  modification  of  the  approach  taken  here  to  compare  ability  effects  of  rental 
arrangements  across  jurisdictions  with  different  regulatory  frameworks,  could  help  to  estimate 
productivity effects of policy-induced restrictions on certain forms of rental transactions—or on rental 
altogether. Exploring these in more detail is left for future research.  
From a policy perspective, the magnitude of the Marshallian inefficiency obtained here, and its adverse 
distributional effect, are striking. To the extent that lack of insurance motivates adoption of sharecropping 
as the predominant contractual form, interventions to make other forms of insurance available could have   16 
high productivity and equity benefits while at the same time contributing to the broader goal of economic 
transformation in rural areas.    17 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics at Household Level 
    By land market participation  
  Total  Lease-out  Autarkic  Lease-in 
Household characteristics         
Household size  5.81  4.55  6.47  6.38 
Number of dependents  2.51  2.05  2.62  2.82 
Number of male adults  1.61  1.06  1.91  1.86 
Number of female adults  1.62  1.37  1.86  1.64 
Female head dummy  0.22  0.47  0.17  0.03 
Head literate  0.33  0.25  0.30  0.43 
Farming is head's primary activity  0.76  0.46  0.87  0.95 
Dwelling has corrugated iron roof  0.74  0.69  0.68  0.83 
Number of rooms in dwellings  2.14  1.91  2.20  2.29 
Agricultural endowments         
Total value of livestock owned (birr)  5712.10  2442.70  6081.68  8337.60 
Value of bulls and oxen (birr)  2495.61  771.34  2661.17  3905.30 
Value of other livestock (birr)  3216.49  1671.36  3420.52  4432.30 
Number of bulls and oxen owned  1.29  0.42  1.40  1.98 
Value of farm assets (birr)  160.35  78.79  152.68  240.13 
Total owned area (ha)  1.27  1.35  1.31  1.18 
Share of good quality land  0.64  0.63  0.76  0.54 
Agricultural production         
Cultivates any land  0.88  0.63  1.00  1.00 
Owned cultivated area (ha)  0.98  0.45  1.30  1.18 
Area of sharecropped out land (ha)  0.28  0.85  0.00  0.00 
Area of fixed rented out land (ha)  0.02  0.04  0.00  0.00 
Area of sharecropped in land (ha)  0.29  0.00  0.00  0.78 
Area of fixed rented in land (ha)  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.07 
Area of leased out land (ha)  0.29  0.89  0.00  0.00 
Area of leased in land (ha)  0.31  0.00  0.00  0.85 
Assets and social capital         
Value of household assets (birr)  300.32  264.51  274.26  354.72 
House value (birr)  7382.48  6560.25  8901.85  6827.77 
No. of male adult children living in the village  0.41  0.61  0.41  0.22 
No. of female adult children living in the village  0.33  0.48  0.32  0.20 
No. of head's brothers living in the village  1.03  0.80  1.02  1.24 
No. of spouse‟s brothers living in the village  0.65  0.54  0.69  0.72 
No. head's sisters living in the village  0.69  0.56  0.68  0.81 
No. spouse's sisters living in the village  0.51  0.41  0.54  0.57 
No. of adult children living in the village  0.74  1.09  0.73  0.42 
No. of brothers and sisters living in the village  2.88  2.31  2.94  3.33 
Number observations  2487  813  770  904 
Source: Own computation from AU/WB/UG land tenure survey.   18 
Table 2: Factor Ratios before and after Land Market Participation 
    By type or rental market participation 
  Total  Lease-out    Autarkic    Lease-in 
Before land market participation             
Household size per ha of owned land  7.01  5.46  ***  7.38    8.16 
No. of adult labor per ha of owned land  3.88  2.96  ***  4.34    4.34 
No. of male adult labor per ha of owned land  1.89  1.23  ***  2.13    2.30 
Number of oxen per ha of owned land  1.35  0.28  ***  1.32  ***  2.41 
No. of observations  2,434  813    770    851 
After land market participation             
Household size per ha of operated land  9.22  20.61  ***  7.38  ***  4.30 
No. of adult labor per ha of operated land  5.11  11.16  ***  4.34  ***  2.34 
No. of male adult labor per ha of operated land  2.26  4.27  ***  2.13  ***  1.23 
Number of oxen per ha of operated land  1.22  1.09    1.32  *  1.20 
No. of observations  2,188  514    770    904 
Source: Own computation from AU/WB/UG land tenure survey.  
Note: Asterisks indicate the difference in significance between means for landlord and autarky groups as compared to tenants 
with *, **, and *** denoting significance at 10%; 5%; and 1%. The top panel excludes 53 landless tenants while 299 pure 
landlords had to be dropped in the bottom panel.   19 
Table 3: Plot Characteristics for Entire Sample  
  All owner-cum-tenants 
 










Relation with partner             
TP relative  0.25    0.66  0.68  0.64  0.39 
TP in-law  0.05    0.13  0.14  0.10  0.10 
TP friend or neighbor  0.04    0.11  0.11  0.10  0.19 
TP unrelated  0.09    0.23  0.21  0.26  0.42 
Female rental partner  0.47    0.47  0.49  0.42  0.28 
Output and input use:             
Crop output/ha (birr)  3476.47  3693.07  3127.07  3125.90  2952.21  3561.46 
Plot size (ha)  0.30  0.28  0.33  0.32  0.39  0.36 
Used fertilizer  0.40  0.38  0.43  0.41  0.52  0.59 
Fertilized used per ha (kg)  54.91  55.40  54.12  51.26  61.69  86.02 
Manure used  0.19  0.26  0.06  0.06  0.08  0.07 
Manure used per ha (kg)  278.00  393.03  92.68  84.30  90.59  246.10 
Used pesticides  0.08  0.07  0.08  0.07  0.10  0.07 
Pesticides used per ha (kg)  0.40  0.35  0.47  0.55  0.09  0.08 
Pair of oxen days per ha  24.99  26.71  22.22  22.13  21.17  24.44 
Male family labor/ha (days)  111.94  127.32  87.11  87.82  84.11  82.76 
Female family labor/ha (days)  56.56  65.54  42.06  42.80  39.41  37.31 
Total family labor/ha (days)  167.28  190.89  129.17  130.61  123.52  120.07 
Used hired labor  0.84  0.86  0.81  0.81  0.81  0.71 
Hired labor/ha (days)  8.08  9.85  5.24  5.36  4.23  6.10 
Plot characteristics:             
Years of possession  13.97  19.75  4.66  4.81  4.28  3.16 
Good soil quality  0.46  0.46  0.45  0.45  0.50  0.37 
Medium soil quality  0.36  0.36  0.37  0.37  0.34  0.41 
Flat land  0.71  0.70  0.72  0.73  0.69  0.73 
Gently sloped land  0.24  0.24  0.23  0.23  0.23  0.25 
Irrigated land  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.01 
Crop choice:             
Teff   0.32  0.29  0.36  0.35  0.48  0.29 
Wheat/barely   0.21  0.20  0.22  0.21  0.24  0.26 
Sorghum/maize   0.30  0.34  0.23  0.23  0.20  0.31 
Pulses   0.13  0.12  0.14  0.16  0.04  0.10 
Oilseeds   0.05  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03 
Number of observations  5443  3360  2083  1728  238  102 
Source: Own computation from AU/WB/UG land tenure survey.  
Note: Only plots with cereals, pulses and oilseeds included.  
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Table 4: Plot Characteristics for Pairs of Operator-cum-Landlords and Owner-cum-Tenants 
  Total  Only owned plots 
  Sample  Landlords  Tenants 
Output and input use:       
Crop output/ha (birr)  3060.91  2709.98  3268.03 
Plot size (ha)  0.33  0.35  0.32 
Used fertilizer  0.37  0.30  0.41 
Fertilized used per ha (kg)  50.75  41.28  56.34 
Manure used  0.28  0.34  0.25 
Manure used per ha (kg)  371.55  421.17  342.22 
Used pesticides  0.07  0.04  0.09 
Pesticides used per ha (kg)  0.22  0.09  0.30 
Pair of oxen days per ha  25.50  24.75  25.95 
Male family labor/ha (days)  113.54  109.00  116.23 
Female family labor/ha (days)  66.18  76.72  59.94 
Total family labor/ha (days)  153.66  145.65  158.38 
Used hired labor  0.84  0.86  0.83 
Hired labor/ha (days)  14.22  7.53  18.17 
Plot characteristics:       
Years of possession  20.48  23.62  18.63 
Good soil quality  0.51  0.56  0.47 
Medium soil quality  0.34  0.32  0.35 
Flat land  0.73  0.74  0.73 
Gently sloped land  0.22  0.21  0.23 
Irrigated land  0.08  0.06  0.08 
Crop choice:       
Teff   0.29  0.24  0.32 
Wheat/barely   0.20  0.19  0.21 
Sorghum/maize   0.42  0.51  0.37 
Pulses   0.12  0.12  0.13 
Oilseeds   0.05  0.04  0.06 
Number of observations  2213  822  1391 
Source: Own computation from AU/WB/UG land tenure survey.   21 
Table 5: Impact of Sharecropping on Output per Hectare 
  Specification 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Sharecrop dummy  -0.082**  -0.132***       
  (2.15)  (3.66)       
Fixed rental dummy  -0.023  -0.043  -0.040  -0.041  -0.048 
  (0.24)  (0.47)  (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.53) 
Only output sharing      -0.142***  -0.143***   
      (3.88)  (3.42)   
Output and input sharing      -0.024  -0.024   
      (0.33)  (0.33)   
Landlord is a relative by blood          -0.111** 
          (2.47) 
Landlord is an in-law          -0.168** 
          (2.56) 
Landlord is a friend/neighbor          -0.159** 
          (2.26) 
No other relationship          -0.172*** 
          (3.04) 
Female landlord (if sharecropped)        0.002  -0.001 
        (0.04)  (0.04) 
Number of years possessed  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002 
  (1.10)  (0.78)  (0.63)  (0.63)  (0.93) 
Good soil quality  0.214***  0.249***  0.247***  0.247***  0.249*** 
  (5.31)  (6.50)  (6.44)  (6.44)  (6.48) 
Medium soil quality  0.180***  0.159***  0.158***  0.158***  0.159*** 
  (4.56)  (4.25)  (4.22)  (4.22)  (4.25) 
Flat land  0.035  0.045  0.047  0.047  0.047 
  (0.55)  (0.75)  (0.79)  (0.79)  (0.79) 
Gently sloped land  0.009  0.019  0.020  0.020  0.020 
  (0.14)  (0.30)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.31) 
Irrigated land  0.040  0.077  0.080  0.080  0.074 
  (0.56)  (1.14)  (1.19)  (1.19)  (1.10) 
Teff    0.551***  0.550***  0.550***  0.551*** 
    (10.20)  (10.18)  (10.18)  (10.19) 
Wheat    0.415***  0.414***  0.414***  0.415*** 
    (7.50)  (7.49)  (7.49)  (7.49) 
Sorghum    -0.075  -0.073  -0.073  -0.077 
    (1.36)  (1.33)  (1.33)  (1.39) 
Pulses    0.133**  0.134**  0.134**  0.133** 
    (2.20)  (2.23)  (2.22)  (2.21) 
Constant  7.561***  7.294***  7.287***  7.287***  7.300*** 
  (99.99)  (84.56)  (84.41)  (84.39)  (84.59) 
Number of observations  5443  5443  5443  5443  5443 
Number of households  826  826  826  826  826 
R
2  0.009  0.114  0.114  0.114  0.114 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   22 
Table 6: Impact of Sharecropping on Yield: Within Household Fixed Effects Estimates with Landlord Characteristics 
  Specification 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Sharecrop dummy (γ)  -0.172***  -0.185***     
  (3.40)  (3.63)     
Only output sharing (γ)      -0.182***  -0.195*** 
      (3.57)  (3.79) 
Output and input sharing (θ)      -0.050  -0.064 
      (0.52)  (0.67) 
Farming is landlord‟s main activity (β)  0.101*  0.100*  0.095  0.094 
 (if sharecropped)  (1.72)  (1.71)  (1.63)  (1.61) 
No. of landlord‟s adult children/ha of rented land    0.008**    0.008* 
    (1.97)    (1.95) 
Number of years possessed  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002 
  (1.06)  (0.96)  (0.98)  (0.88) 
Good soil quality  0.292***  0.289***  0.289***  0.287*** 
  (6.19)  (6.13)  (6.13)  (6.07) 
Medium soil quality  0.175***  0.173***  0.174***  0.172*** 
  (3.84)  (3.79)  (3.81)  (3.77) 
Flat land  0.031  0.036  0.035  0.039 
  (0.42)  (0.48)  (0.47)  (0.53) 
Gently sloped land  0.041  0.044  0.043  0.046 
  (0.53)  (0.56)  (0.55)  (0.59) 
Irrigated land  0.041  0.038  0.045  0.042 
  (0.51)  (0.48)  (0.57)  (0.53) 
Teff  0.558***  0.558***  0.557***  0.557*** 
  (8.70)  (8.71)  (8.68)  (8.70) 
Wheat  0.463***  0.464***  0.462***  0.463*** 
  (7.08)  (7.09)  (7.06)  (7.07) 
Sorghum  -0.075  -0.076  -0.074  -0.074 
  (1.15)  (1.16)  (1.13)  (1.14) 
Pulses  0.217***  0.216***  0.218***  0.216*** 
  (3.00)  (2.99)  (3.01)  (2.99) 
Constant  7.258***  7.251***  7.252***  7.245*** 
  (68.75)  (68.67)  (68.66)  (68.59) 
Number of observations  3765  3765  3765  3765 
Number of households  637  637  637  637 
R
2  0.114  0.115  0.115  0.116 
Coefficient tests         
γ +β= 0  8.64***  9.39***  8.95***  9.70*** 
θ +β= 0       1.34  1.59 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Impact of Sharecropping on Productivity (IV Estimates): Household Fixed Effects with Landlord Characteristics 
  Methodology used 
  2SLS  GMM  LIML  Fuller  
Only output sharing (γ)  -0.247***  -0.229***  -0.245***  -0.245*** 
  (3.70)  (3.66)  (3.58)  (3.59) 
Output and input sharing (θ)  -0.305  -0.336  -0.333  -0.331 
  (0.70)  (0.79)  (0.71)  (0.71) 
Farming is landlord‟s main activity (β)  0.137**  0.136**  0.138**  0.138** 
(if sharecropped only)  (2.19)  (2.19)  (2.19)  (2.19) 
No. of adult children per ha of rented out land   0.008**  0.008**  0.008**  0.008** 
  (2.16)  (2.01)  (2.16)  (2.16) 
Number of years possessed  -0.005*  -0.005*  -0.005*  -0.005* 
  (1.72)  (1.86)  (1.74)  (1.73) 
Good soil quality  0.291***  0.287***  0.292***  0.292*** 
  (6.03)  (5.70)  (6.03)  (6.03) 
Medium soil quality  0.170***  0.167***  0.170***  0.170*** 
  (3.70)  (3.46)  (3.70)  (3.70) 
Flat land  0.045  0.033  0.044  0.044 
  (0.60)  (0.45)  (0.59)  (0.59) 
Gently sloped land  0.054  0.033  0.053  0.053 
  (0.69)  (0.43)  (0.68)  (0.68) 
Irrigated land  0.034  0.017  0.033  0.033 
  (0.42)  (0.21)  (0.40)  (0.40) 
Teff  0.561***  0.575***  0.561***  0.561*** 
  (8.69)  (9.11)  (8.69)  (8.69) 
Wheat  0.464***  0.481***  0.464***  0.464*** 
  (7.04)  (7.41)  (7.04)  (7.04) 
Sorghum  -0.076  -0.060  -0.076  -0.076 
  (1.15)  (0.90)  (1.16)  (1.16) 
Pulses  0.215***  0.239***  0.215***  0.215*** 
  (2.96)  (2.98)  (2.96)  (2.96) 
Number of observations  3743  3743  3743  3743 
Number of households  635  635  635  635 
R
2  0.113  0.113  0.113  0.113 
Sargan/Hansen J Statistic  14.599  14.948  14.596  14.596 
Sargan/Hansen J Chi2  0.147  0.134  0.148  0.148 
Anderson-Rubin Statistic      14.630  14.630 
Anderson-Rubin Chi2      0.146  0.146 
Anderson/Kleibergen-Paap Statistic  107.203  46.157  107.203  107.203 
Anderson/Kleibergen-Paap Chi2  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Cragg-Donald/Kleibergen-Paap Statistic  9.181  4.127  9.181  9.181 
Coefficient tests         
γ +β= 0   14.58***  14.29***  14.45***  14.46*** 
θ +β= 0   0.90  1.08  0.90  0.90 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Contract choice (sharecropping only, output, or input sharing) is instrumented using landlord characteristics, in particular plot 
distance from homestead, land ownership, household composition (number of dependents, number of male adults, number of 
female adults), assets (no. of oxen, value of other livestock, iron roof), and characteristics of the head (age, sex, literacy level, and 
farming as a primary activity). First-stage regressions are reported in appendix table 6.  
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Table 8: Productivity Differential between Rental Partners: Pair Fixed Effects with Owned Plots Only 
    With selectivity correction 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Cultivated by tenant   0.174***  0.178***  0.262***  0.475***  0.490***  0.598*** 
  (3.894)  (2.842)  (3.808)  (3.085)  (2.839)  (3.298) 
Tenant with female partner    -0.007  0.067    -0.025  0.051 
    (0.091)  (0.782)    (0.240)  (0.428) 
Holding size in hectares (log)      -0.106***      -0.109* 
      (2.896)      (1.914) 
Number of years possessed  -0.006**  -0.006**  -0.005**  -0.005  -0.005  -0.004 
  (2.380)  (2.372)  (1.982)  (1.524)  (1.520)  (1.134) 
Good soil quality  0.265***  0.264***  0.253***  0.281***  0.281***  0.269*** 
  (3.884)  (3.878)  (3.706)  (3.770)  (3.758)  (3.570) 
Medium soil quality  0.160**  0.160**  0.160**  0.159**  0.159**  0.159** 
  (2.383)  (2.380)  (2.383)  (2.115)  (2.109)  (2.098) 
Flat land  0.131  0.131  0.113  0.141  0.141  0.123 
  (1.314)  (1.314)  (1.132)  (1.327)  (1.334)  (1.151) 
Gently sloped land  0.105  0.105  0.091  0.120  0.121  0.106 
  (0.995)  (0.996)  (0.863)  (1.065)  (1.071)  (0.928) 
Irrigated land  0.349***  0.349***  0.351***  0.354***  0.355***  0.355*** 
  (3.733)  (3.732)  (3.757)  (2.837)  (2.839)  (2.857) 
Teff  0.521***  0.521***  0.540***  0.518***  0.518***  0.536*** 
  (9.222)  (9.217)  (9.502)  (7.765)  (7.781)  (7.860) 
Wheat  0.435***  0.435***  0.449***  0.431***  0.431***  0.445*** 
  (7.288)  (7.286)  (7.509)  (7.042)  (7.045)  (7.136) 
Sorghum  -0.164***  -0.164***  -0.161***  -0.156***  -0.156***  -0.153** 
  (2.926)  (2.927)  (2.874)  (2.613)  (2.622)  (2.563) 
Pulses  -0.100  -0.100  -0.081  -0.099  -0.098  -0.078 
  (1.458)  (1.454)  (1.175)  (1.111)  (1.097)  (0.892) 
Constant  7.080***  7.080***  7.028***  6.945***  6.943***  6.864*** 
  (54.679)  (54.664)  (53.876)  (35.611)  (35.595)  (34.478) 
Selection variables             
Landlord cultivators        -0.076  -0.077  -0.098 
        (0.687)  (0.692)  (0.886) 
Tenants        0.325***  0.327***  0.322*** 
        (2.764)  (2.755)  (2.737) 
Number of observations  2224  2224  2224  2224  2224  2224 
Number of households  366  366  366  366  366  366 
R
2  0.144  0.144  0.148  0.150  0.150  0.154 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Household 
level variables are for cultivator households. 
a In order to describe selection into rental market participation regimes, we use a multinomial selection method proposed by Lee 
(1983). The reported t statistics are robust to any general  form of  heteroscedasticity.  The  method suggested by Dubin and 
McFadden (1984), and generalized by Bourguignon et al. (2007), is used alternatively, but the results are not reported as they are 
similar to those obtained using the Lee 91983) approach.     25 
Table 9: Productivity Differential between Rental Partners: Within Landlord Fixed Effects 
  Specification 
  (1)  (2) 
Cultivated by the tenant household  -0.054  0.005 
  (-0.728)  (0.052) 
Tenant with female partner    -0.097 
    (-1.105) 
Number of years possessed  -0.008***  -0.008*** 
  (-2.691)  (-2.634) 
Good soil quality  0.329***  0.325*** 
  (4.291)  (4.227) 
Medium soil quality  0.285***  0.284*** 
  (3.829)  (3.805) 
Flat land  0.173  0.172 
  (1.525)  (1.508) 
Gently sloped land  0.143  0.140 
  (1.178)  (1.158) 
Irrigated land  0.346***  0.353*** 
  (3.050)  (3.108) 
Teff  0.589***  0.590*** 
  (9.082)  (9.104) 
Wheat  0.343***  0.346*** 
  (5.217)  (5.258) 
Sorghum  -0.239***  -0.242*** 
  (-3.690)  (-3.724) 
Pulses  -0.101  -0.099 
  (-1.315)  (-1.291) 
Constant  7.038***  7.043*** 
  (47.314)  (47.330) 
Number of observations  1,717  1,717 
Number of households  357  357 
R
2  0.182  0.182 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   26 
Appendix table 1: Descriptive Statistics at Household Level for Pairs of Rental Partners 
   Total  Landlord  Tenant 
Household characteristics       
Household size  5.37  4.49  6.24 
Number of dependents  2.44  2.05  2.83 
Number of male adults  1.41  1.03  1.79 
Number of female adults  1.46  1.35  1.57 
Female head dummy  0.25  0.48  0.02 
Head literate  0.35  0.24  0.46 
Farming is head's primary activity  0.70  0.45  0.95 
Dwelling has corrugated iron roof  0.77  0.70  0.84 
Number of rooms in dwellings  2.08  1.89  2.26 
Age of head (years)  48.79  55.34  42.30 
Agricultural endowments       
Total value of livestock owned (birr)  5511.98  2397.64  8602.83 
Value of bulls and oxen (birr)  2356.21  720.91  3979.16 
Value of other livestock (birr)  3155.78  1676.73  4623.67 
Number of bulls and oxen owned  1.22  0.40  2.03 
Value of farm assets (birr)  159.81  72.79  246.07 
Total owned area (ha)  1.30  1.41  1.18 
Share of good quality land  0.60  0.67  0.52 
Agricultural production       
Cultivates any land  0.81  0.62  1.00 
Owned cultivated area (ha)  0.81  0.44  1.18 
Area of sharecropped out land (ha)  0.46  0.93  0.00 
Area of fixed rented out land (ha)  0.02  0.05  0.00 
Area of sharecropped in land (ha)  0.44  0.00  0.87 
Area of fixed rented in land (ha)  0.03  0.00  0.07 
Area of leased out land (ha)  0.49  0.97  0.01 
Area of leased in land (ha)  0.47  0.00  0.93 
Assets and social capital       
Value of household assets (birr)  351.40  248.27  453.76 
House value (birr)  6494.70  6108.19  6878.30 
No. of male adult children living in the village  0.43  0.64  0.21 
No. of female adult children living in the village  0.35  0.50  0.19 
No. of head's brothers living in the village  1.04  0.81  1.27 
No. of spouse‟s brothers living in the village  0.65  0.54  0.77 
No. head's sisters living in the village  0.67  0.54  0.81 
No. spouse's sisters living in the village  0.50  0.41  0.59 
No. of adult children living in the village  0.77  1.14  0.40 
No. of brothers and sisters living in the village  2.87  2.29  3.44 
Number of observations  1584  789  795 
   27 
Appendix table 2: Plot Characteristics for Owner-cum-Tenants with Partner Information Only  












Relation with partner           
TP relative    0.72  0.73  0.76  0.38 
TP in-law    0.13  0.13  0.11  0.15 
TP friend or neighbor    0.10  0.10  0.08  0.23 
TP unrelated    0.18  0.17  0.16  0.38 
Female rental partner    0.49  0.52  0.39  0.31 
Output and input use:           
Crop output/ha (birr)  3413.91  3090.97  3115.83  3100.04  2522.06 
Plot size (ha)  0.28  0.33  0.32  0.39  0.37 
Used fertilizer  0.41  0.43  0.39  0.64  0.64 
Fertilized used per ha (kg)  58.67  53.20  49.50  74.81  74.60 
Manure used  0.23  0.07  0.07  0.07  0.03 
Manure used per ha (kg)  313.97  80.64  85.62  70.57  6.29 
Used pesticides  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.13  0.03 
Pesticides used per ha (kg)  0.33  0.19  0.20  0.12  0.02 
Pair of oxen days per ha  26.08  20.97  20.65  21.22  25.34 
Male family labor/ha (days)  123.52  90.22  92.94  75.50  75.19 
Female family labor/ha (days)  61.22  44.62  46.28  36.60  35.17 
Total family labor/ha (days)  184.74  134.84  139.22  112.11  110.37 
Used hired labor  0.84  0.83  0.83  0.83  0.72 
Hired labor/ha (days)  11.93  5.63  5.92  4.31  3.74 
Plot characteristics:           
Years of possession  19.05  4.94  5.06  4.67  3.21 
Good soil quality  0.45  0.46  0.48  0.44  0.33 
Medium soil quality  0.37  0.37  0.37  0.38  0.41 
Flat land  0.72  0.71  0.72  0.64  0.74 
Gently sloped land  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.25  0.26 
Irrigated land  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.02  0.00 
Crop choice:           
Teff   0.29  0.35  0.34  0.44  0.38 
Wheat/barely   0.21  0.22  0.22  0.24  0.28 
Sorghum/maize   0.33  0.25  0.25  0.21  0.28 
Pulses   0.12  0.14  0.15  0.05  0.05 
Oilseeds   0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05  0.00 
Number of observations  2630  1135  955  135  39 
Source: Own computation from AU/WB/UG land tenure survey.  
Note: Only plots with cereals, pulses and oilseeds included.    28 
Appendix table 3: Test of Constant Returns to Scale at the Holding Level 
  (1)  (2) 
Holding size in hectares (log)  0.409***  0.421*** 
  (15.794)  (15.952) 
Male family labor days (log)  0.347***   
  (14.447)   
Female family labor days (log)  -0.051**   
  (-2.391)   
Hired labor days (log)  0.082***   
  (2.903)   
Family and hired labor days (log)    0.343*** 
    (13.740) 
Pair of oxen days (log)  0.073***  0.092*** 
  (3.041)  (3.762) 
Chemical fertilizer in kg (log)  0.166***  0.166*** 
  (7.086)  (6.970) 
Manure in kg (log)  0.017  0.021 
  (1.126)  (1.427) 
Dummy female family labor
a  -0.299***   
  (-2.756)   
Dummy hired labor
a  0.028   
  (0.362)   
Dummy chemical fertilizer
a  0.323***  0.311*** 
  (3.041)  (2.878) 
Dummy manure
a  0.137  0.190** 
  (1.608)  (2.192) 
Number of years possessed  -0.007***  -0.006*** 
  (-4.081)  (-3.814) 
Good soil quality  0.475***  0.510*** 
  (6.724)  (7.099) 
Medium soil quality  0.317***  0.357*** 
  (4.314)  (4.771) 
Flat land  -0.037  -0.066 
  (-0.392)  (-0.681) 
Gently sloped land  -0.086  -0.077 
  (-0.861)  (-0.757) 
Irrigated land  0.165**  0.209*** 
  (2.403)  (2.997) 
Constant  5.369***  5.013*** 
  (28.202)  (26.662) 
Number of observations  1572  1572 
Adjusted R
2  0.694  0.681 
F-test of constant returns to scale  1.200  2.320 
p-value for the test of constant returns to scale  0.273  0.128 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
aThe value of the dummy is 1 if the input is not used, and the value is 0 if the input is used (see Battese (1997) for the 
formalization of this method). All inputs are in logs.    29 
Appendix Table 4: Productivity Impact of Sharecropping Controlling for Observed Inputs 
    Restricted sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Fixed rental dummy  -0.018     
  (0.23)     
Only output sharing  -0.021  -0.017  -0.055 
  (0.66)  (0.42)  (1.26) 
Output and input sharing  0.092  0.095  0.047 
  (1.52)  (1.22)  (0.58) 
Farming is landlord‟s main activity (if sharecropped)      0.086* 
      (1.74) 
No. of adult children per ha of rented out land      0.004 
      (1.08) 
Number of years possessed  -0.000  -0.001  -0.000 
  (0.01)  (0.23)  (0.18) 
Good soil quality  0.157***  0.195***  0.194*** 
  (4.76)  (4.80)  (4.78) 
Medium soil quality  0.098***  0.124***  0.123*** 
  (3.09)  (3.19)  (3.18) 
Flat land  0.032  0.026  0.030 
  (0.64)  (0.42)  (0.48) 
Gently sloped land  0.005  0.046  0.049 
  (0.09)  (0.70)  (0.75) 
Irrigated land  -0.016  -0.047  -0.049 
  (0.28)  (0.71)  (0.72) 
Teff  0.045  0.006  0.006 
  (0.86)  (0.09)  (0.10) 
Wheat  -0.034  -0.019  -0.019 
  (0.66)  (0.31)  (0.30) 
Sorghum  -0.289***  -0.323***  -0.325*** 
  (5.94)  (5.61)  (5.63) 
Pulses  0.111**  0.128**  0.128** 
  (2.14)  (2.06)  (2.06) 
Male adult labor (days per hectare)  0.251***  0.255***  0.255*** 
  (9.62)  (8.20)  (8.18) 
Female adult labor (days per hectare)  0.086***  0.107***  0.106*** 
  (4.33)  (4.42)  (4.38) 
Hired labor (days per hectare)  0.015  0.036  0.037 
  (0.55)  (1.10)  (1.12) 
Oxen (days per hectare)  0.286***  0.266***  0.266*** 
  (13.35)  (10.03)  (10.05) 
Chemical fertilizer (kg per hectare)  0.133***  0.121***  0.122*** 
  (6.18)  (4.83)  (4.84) 
Manure (kg per hectare)  0.049**  0.056**  0.055** 
  (2.47)  (2.27)  (2.25) 
Dummy female family labor
a  0.331***  0.566***  0.566*** 
  (4.69)  (6.31)  (6.32) 
Dummy hired labor
a  -0.152*  -0.153  -0.149 
  (1.92)  (1.60)  (1.56) 
Dummy chemical fertilizer
a  0.346***  0.275**  0.274** 
  (3.38)  (2.29)  (2.29) 
Dummy manure
a  0.245*  0.280*  0.277* 
  (1.80)  (1.68)  (1.67) 
Constant  4.885***  4.853***  4.852*** 
  (25.07)  (20.59)  (20.59) 
Number of observations  5443  3765  3765 
Number of households  826  637  637 
R
2  0.367  0.370  0.371 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
aThe value of the dummy is 1 if the input is not used, and the value is 0 if the input is used. All inputs are in logs.    30 
Appendix table 5: Impact of Sharecropping on Input Intensity per Hectare 
  Household Fixed Effects  RE Tobit (Marginal Effects)
a 
  Male adult labor 
days per ha (log) 
Total labor days 
per ha (log) 
Pair of oxen 
days per ha (log) 
Quantity of fertilizer in 
Kg/Ha 
Sharecrop dummy  -0.150***  -0.156***  -0.194***  -0.283*** 
  (-4.870)  (-4.990)  (-6.382)  (-4.448) 
Fixed rental dummy  0.011  -0.017  -0.032  -0.143 
  (0.142)  (-0.218)  (-0.414)  (-0.948) 
Number of years possessed  -0.002  -0.002  -0.004**  -0.008** 
  (-1.220)  (-1.400)  (-2.170)  (-2.193) 
Good soil quality  0.107***  0.147***  0.117***  -0.055 
  (3.270)  (4.429)  (3.624)  (-0.829) 
Medium soil quality  0.073**  0.097***  0.062**  0.071 
  (2.288)  (2.985)  (1.979)  (1.108) 
Flat land  0.065  0.068  0.009  -0.102 
  (1.281)  (1.313)  (0.189)  (-0.998) 
Gently sloped land  0.068  0.071  0.034  -0.236** 
  (1.269)  (1.294)  (0.647)  (-2.174) 
Irrigated land  0.101*  0.120**  0.155***  -0.210 
  (1.755)  (2.057)  (2.736)  (-1.615) 
Teff  0.442***  0.530***  0.356***  2.503*** 
  (9.606)  (11.313)  (7.830)  (18.301) 
Wheat  0.337***  0.382***  0.343***  2.573*** 
  (7.157)  (7.969)  (7.370)  (18.471) 
Sorghum  0.126***  0.234***  0.140***  0.962*** 
  (2.692)  (4.878)  (3.023)  (7.518) 
Pulses  -0.113**  -0.109**  -0.094*  0.290* 
  (-2.204)  (-2.084)  (-1.861)  (1.934) 
Constant  3.895***  4.219***  2.634***      (53.077)  (56.391)  (36.320)   
Number of observations  5443  5443  5443  5443 
Number of households  826  826  826  826 
R
2  0.095  0.111  0.077    Log-Likelihood        -15041.72 
Chi-squared        1443.746 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
a The reported marginal effects for the fertilizer regression are provided in the form of dlny/dx such that we can interpret the 
coefficient of the tenancy dummy similarly to that of the labor and draft power intensity regressions as the percentage deviations 
of input intensities on sharecropped plots relative to owner-cultivated plots.   31 
Appendix Table 6: First-Stage Regressions of Contract Choice: Household Fixed Effects Linear Probability Models 
  Type of arrangement  
  Output sharing only  Output and input sharing 
Identifying instruments (landlord’s characteristics)     
Distance of the plot from homestead (walking minutes)  0.001***  -0.000*** 
  (2.88)  (2.84) 
Farming head‟s primary activity  -0.723***  -0.068*** 
  (39.93)  (4.45) 
Total owned land by the landlord  0.005  0.013** 
  (0.79)  (2.29) 
Number of oxen owned  -0.044***  0.020*** 
  (7.28)  (3.92) 
Value of other animals x 10
-3 (Birr)  -0.002  -0.002 
  (1.02)  (1.37) 
Roof corrugated iron sheet  -0.036***  0.046*** 
  (2.78)  (4.22) 
Number of dependents  0.006*  -0.013*** 
  (1.65)  (4.29) 
Number of male adults  0.001  -0.009** 
  (0.12)  (2.21) 
Number of female adults  -0.011**  0.013*** 
  (2.22)  (3.04) 
Age of household head (years)  0.000  0.001*** 
  (0.97)  (3.83) 
Female headed household  0.033**  -0.014 
  (2.12)  (1.07) 
Household head can read and write  0.045***  -0.015 
  (3.93)  (1.59) 
Farming is landlord‟s main activity (if sharecropped)  0.769***  0.111*** 
  (44.44)  (7.57) 
No. of adult children per ha of rented out land  0.002*  -0.000 
  (1.71)  (0.31) 
Number of years possessed  -0.002**  -0.003*** 
  (2.45)  (5.62) 
Good soil quality  -0.014  0.015 
  (1.24)  (1.59) 
Medium soil quality  -0.004  0.007 
  (0.38)  (0.72) 
Flat land  0.017  -0.029* 
  (0.98)  (1.95) 
Gently sloped land  0.009  -0.024 
  (0.48)  (1.51) 
Irrigated land  0.042**  -0.036** 
  (2.19)  (2.22) 
Teff  -0.012  0.011 
  (0.75)  (0.82) 
Wheat  -0.011  0.011 
  (0.67)  (0.84) 
Sorghum  0.008  -0.015 
  (0.49)  (1.09) 
Pulses  0.001  -0.001 
  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Constant  0.812***  0.056* 
  (23.61)  (1.92) 
Number of observations  3745  3745 
Number of households  637  637 
R
2  0.834  0.150 
Shea Partial R
2  0.600  0.048 
Partial R
2  0.611  0.049 
F-test of excluded instruments F(12, 3084)  403.50  13.15 
Note: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   32 
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